‘Symbolic, Populist Move’: Why Reactionary Fights Against Terrorism May Fail In North West Nigeria

Nigeria’s Minister of State for Defence, Bello Matawalle, touched down at the Sultan Abubakar International Airport in Sokoto, North West Nigeria, on Tuesday, Sept. 4, accompanied by some stern-looking security chiefs—their mission was to supervise military operations against terrorists ravaging the region. 

The trip came a few days after President Bola Tinubu, who took over power with the promise to end insecurity and create a thriving business environment, ordered Matawalle and the chiefs to relocate to Sokoto to contain the ruthless attacks, killing of villagers, and abduction of commuters along major highways in the region.

This initiative gets little to no appraisal from citizens because it is not the first time authorities have issued such a directive. 

At the height of the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeastern region, the military moved its headquarters to Maiduguri, the capital of Borno, in an attempt to add “impetus and renew vigour” to the fight against terrorism. Although the military recorded some battlefield successes, insurgency persists in the region as terrorists spread their campaign of terror, raiding and levying rural communities.

Locals and security analysts in the northwestern region seem unconvinced that the redeployment of the service chiefs to Sokoto would impact military operations on the frontline, adding that it’s at best a “symbolic and populist move.” Affected residents in Sokoto, Zamfara, and Katsina believe authorities have left them at the mercy of the marauders.  Statistics from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) show that no fewer than 4000 people have been killed across northwestern states since Tinubu became Nigeria’s president. Interestingly, a former governor of Zamfara, the epicentre of the crisis, is the junior defence minister under President Tinubu.

“Their presence in Sokoto won’t have any long-lasting impact because they’re not going to be the ones to take the fight to the forest or bandits’ camps with the soldiers. We have a GOC (General Officer Commanding) in Sokoto, a Brigade in Zamfara and Katsina, two Battalions in Katsina, a super camp in Faskari and other military formations scattered across the region. Banditry is not festering because the service chiefs were in Abuja, and the military deals with orders,” a researcher with a vast understanding of military operations in the region told HumAngle. We are not revealing his identity because he is not permitted to speak to journalists, especially on sensitive matters.

The northwest region has been a hotbed of rampant killings and kidnappings for nearly a decade now. The terrorists, known among locals as bandits, reign supreme in rural villages, taking over the governance and economy of many local communities. They also sexually assault women and kill traditional rulers who are vocal against them. For instance, a terror group gruesomely executed the district head of Gatawa in the Sabon Birni area of Sokoto, Isa Bawa, infusing anti-government sentiments in the locals.

Recently, a viral clip showed a notorious terror leader, Bello Turji, and his ‘boys’ jubilating and chanting ‘Allahu Akbar’ (an Arabic phrase meaning Allah is great and typically used in that context by insurgents) after setting two Mines Resistant Armour Personnel (MRAP) vehicles belonging to the military ablaze. 

A pattern of reactionary response to terror menaces has been established on many occasions, with authorities doing their best to allay festering fears among residents, especially mass killings and abductions. Most of the time, this leaves locals and community chiefs assisting in the operations at the beck and call of the terrorists’ caprices.

“We’ve seen such moves in the past and seem reactionary,” said Samuel Malik, a senior researcher at Good Governance Africa, a pan-African think-tank. “It doesn’t appear to be a properly planned move but a response to the plea by Nigerians to rising insecurity. Their presence there won’t have much impact; the same soldiers who have been fighting in this region will remain at the frontline. The service chiefs would just be there to give directives which they can give from any part of the country.”

Security experts and researchers we contacted agreed on one thing: Authorities need a clear and comprehensive plan to restore peace in the region.

Rural terrorism, a moving conflict which has now become a hard nut to crack, escalated in 2011, spreading across five northwestern states. The epicentre of the conflict, Zamfara, is vast and fringed by forests that extend to other states, some of which share borders with neighbouring countries like the Republic of Benin and the Niger Republic. This provides the terrorists with ample windows to quickly escape and move to other areas when they’re under intense fires in one location. 

There have been calls for a simultaneous and sustained offensive across the region to clog the raging tide of the conflict. But it’s unclear if the military has the manpower to carry out such large-scale operations. The military is stretched thin due to conflict elsewhere in the country — farmer-herder conflict in the Northcentral, the Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast, secessionist agitation in the Southeast, and oil theft in the South-south.

“They (military) would say they don’t have enough soldiers to do that, but I disagree. Military formations are scattered across strategic locations in the region, even in less vulnerable areas. Suppose these formations could launch sustained and spontaneous attacks across the region. In that case, I think we may have a respite, and a lot of these bandits would be eliminated,” a resident in the region chipped in, adding that “we don’t negotiate from a position of weakness.” The resident, a social critic who asked not to be named over the fear of reprisals, cited previous and ongoing dialogues with some of the terrorists. “It’s better to fight them, after which the government can now listen to some of the bandits and talk from a position of strength,” he added.

Authorities in the region, including state governors, federal agencies, and the military, have had a disjointed approach to the conflict over the years. They have stood behind contrasting approaches, with some favouring dialogue and others opting for kinetic action. Matawalle, a former governor of Zamfara — the heartbeat of the conflict — who is now leading a pack of military chiefs to the region, had in the past offered a failed peace deal to the terrorists, eschewing at first regional collaboration and strategy until the terrorists went berserk.

Lately,  the defence minister has been in a row of words with notorious terrorist Bello Turji. The latter had accused Matawalle of handling issues with kids’ gloves, leading to the escalation of the conflict when he was governor.

“Going by previous engagements in the region, violent extremism like this cannot only be dealt with militarily. There’s a long history and context to the root causes, which must also be understood and addressed,” Malik insisted during a phone conversation with HumAngle. There are indications authorities have been transferring policy initiatives from the northeast conflict without considering the contextual variations of the issues in the northwest. For instance, the tacit mobilisation of militias opened a tug of tit-for-tat killings between Hausas and Fulanis in the region.

“Due to the success of some non-kinetic efforts, there are indications that they are looking at adopting the same tactics in the northwest. While no one knows whether it will work, it’s important to note that the two conflicts are distinct. We’re dealing with criminality in the northwest. In all of this, understanding the root causes puts the government in a better position to address the conflict,” Malik noted.